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This article explores the role that product- and firm-
centered heritage plays as an advantage-creating re-
source and competitive dynamic in contributing to
minimizing risks for firms in global production net-
works (GPN). Research on the management of risk
has been identified as critical for developing an un-
derstanding of the underlying determinants of GPN.
In the satellite industry, key risks relate to launch,
extreme conditions in outer space, and challenges
concerning repair. These risks are minimized by the
development and management of heritage. Heritage
is a reputational asset founded on proven technology
embedded in products and/or firm-based relationships
that have values or associations that accumulate and
are passed down over time. The risks associated with
the space sector are extreme; however, heritage also
plays an important but unacknowledged role in other
economic sectors, including shipping, nuclear energy,
rail, medical technologies, and aviation. The article
adds to the economic geography literature in three
ways. First, it highlights the central role that regula-
tors and insurance providers play in defining market
imperatives for GPN. Second, it identifies and
explores heritage as a reputational asset, providing
both a source of competitiveness and a competitive
dynamic influencing firm-based routines and inter-
firm relationships. Third, it provides the first in-
depth analysis of the satellite industry in the context
of heritage—a sector that impacts on the everyday
activities of government agencies, citizens, and firms.
This analysis of heritage is based on eighty in-depth
interviews with representatives from across the UK
space sector.
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Recently, the focus of the global production net-
works (GPN) debate has shifted from a primary
focus on governance (Gereffi, Humphrey, and
Sturgeon 2005) toward an emphasis on dynamics
and the development of the analytical framework
GPN 2.0 (Coe and Yeung 2015; Yeung and Coe
2015). Understanding the dynamics of GPN includes
exploring the ways in which firm and nonfirm actors
manage risk. This article explores these dynamics
within the context of the space sector, with a specific
focus on the role that heritage plays in the manage-
ment of risk and in mediating the interrelationships
between firms and nonfirm actors.
This analysis positions heritage as a reputational asset
that provides a source of competitive advantage for
satellite manufacturers, while influencing firm-based
routines and the dynamics of GPN organization.
A competitive advantage is the ability of a firm to
maintain a margin over its rivals with respect to product
differentiation (Ajitabh and Momaya 2004; Chikán
2008). Heritage is often understood as the “historical
record of certain places” (Wyrwich 2012, 424), build-
ings, or brands. Heritage is created through an accumu-
lation process involving a layering of encounters
between people, places, buildings, products, or firms.
This layering involves the creation of some form of
heritage-based value, narrative, or association.
Heritage is also product- and firm-centered, founded
on proven technology or firm-based relationships. For
satellite manufacturers, a tangible measure of their heri-
tage is component flight history or the number of suc-
cessful satellite missions involving a firm’s products or
employees. The term heritage is used by those involved
in the space sector and is considered to be a core source
of competitive advantage.
Developing and maintaining heritage is a market
imperative for satellite manufacturers given that her-
itage signals technical competency, which is favored
by stakeholders (including customers, investors, reg-
ulators, and insurers) tasked with minimizing risks.
This article explores the relationship between heri-
tage, competitiveness, and risk by considering the
following research questions. First, what role do
regulators and insurance providers play in defining
risk management as a market imperative in the space
sector? Second, how does heritage function as
a reputational asset by providing a source of com-
petitiveness for firms in high-risk sectors? Third, as
a competitive dynamic, how does heritage influence
firm-based routines and interfirm relationships?
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This study contributes to existing economic geography theory in three ways, which
link to the above research questions. First, it highlights the central role that regulators
and insurance providers play in defining market imperatives for GPN. This addresses
the first research question, specifically focusing on why minimizing risk is a central
market imperative for satellite manufacturers, and how this is shaped by the priorities
set by regulators and insurance providers. To Coe and Yeung (2015), the primary risks
associated with globalizing industries (electronics, automotive) are changing demand,
new technology, and financial crisis. Labor and environmental risks are more prevalent
across labor-intensive and resource-extractive industries. For the space industry, the
risks relate to the extreme conditions the technology is exposed to during launch and
operations, combined with the unrealistic costs of in-orbit repairs. Governments en-
force stringent regulations to reduce space risks, while insurance regulators impose
high premiums on nonproven technology. These standards set by nonfirm actors
reinforce the importance of heritage, shaping the sector’s organization of production
and competitive dynamics.
Second, the article conceptualizes heritage as an advantage-creating resource in-
volved in the mitigation of risks by firms in GPN, contributing to understanding the
underlying determinants of GPN (Neilson et al. 2018). To Yeung and Coe (2015, 37)
“cost reduction alone … cannot be the fundamental driver of evolving global produc-
tion networks.” Instead, there are other market imperatives or market forces that
influence organizational routines and the prioritization of resources that are
(re)deployed and (re)configured in GPN. One market imperative is the management
of risk, which is particularly relevant in industries characterized by highly specialized
technical knowledge, often involving customized products and high value, politically
sensitive public procurement projects. This concern with mitigating risk is central to
the developing literature on GPN 2.0 (Coe and Yeung 2015).
Perhaps the most important aspect of risk is the identification of risk amelioration
strategies. Coping strategies for responding to risk are sector and even firm specific,
given sector heterogeneity and the idiosyncratic nature of firms (Boschma and Frenken
2006). A strong risk amelioration strategy can differentiate a firm from its competitors,
providing a source of competitive advantage. The development and management of
heritage provides satellite manufacturers with a competitive advantage. Additionally,
heritage plays an important but unacknowledged role in other high-tech sectors and in
procurement relationships. Nevertheless, heritage in the context of corporate competi-
tiveness has been underexplored and merits further consideration. The only exception
perhaps is Tokatli (2007), who explores heritage in relation to retro fashion and De
Vaan, Boschma, and Frenken (2013), who argue that heritage brings the advantage of
experience. This article addresses this gap through the second research question by
exploring heritage as a competitive advantage. Satellite manufacturers maintain their
heritage by adopting an incremental approach to innovation. Therefore, as well as
being an advantage-creating resource, heritage is a competitive dynamic (defined as
independent variables that drive firm strategies) that influences firm-based routines
(Yeung and Coe 2015) and interfirm relationships. This is the focus for the third
research question and final part of the article, which aims to deepen the understanding
of heritage and its role in risk management in GPN.
Third, this article provides the first in-depth analysis of the space sector in the
context of heritage, which is important given the increasing dependence of socioeco-
nomic processes on satellite-enabled applications (including communication, naviga-
tion, and earth observation). Any disruption to the production of these applications
poses significant security, societal, and economic risk. Thus, satellite technology is
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defined by the UK government to be critical national infrastructure (Center for the
Protection of National Infrastructure 2016). Nevertheless, a firm-level understanding of
the satellite industry and its economic geography remains an “undeveloped avenue of
inquiry” (MacDonald 2007, 611). This article contributes to addressing this gap by
building upon the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, dynamic capabilities, and
evolutionary approaches. The relationships between heritage and these approaches are
explored in the next section.
Dynamic Capabilities, Resources, and the Management of
Risk in GPN
This article aligns with the recent emphasis on developing a more dynamic GPN
theory, explaining “the emergence of different firm-specific activities, strategic net-
work effects, and territorial outcomes” (Yeung and Coe 2015, 29). This includes
understanding the interrelationships between risk and actor-specific strategies. Five
different forms of risk have been identified that impact GPN: (1) economic (e.g.,
shifting market or technological conditions); (2) product (e.g., brand damage associated
with quality and other issues); (3) regulatory (e.g., shifting rule regimes); (4) labor
(e.g., struggles over wages and conditions); and (v) environmental (e.g., pollution or
natural disaster) (Yeung and Coe 2015). These risks are generally “beyond the control
or confines of individual actors” but instead form part of a common environment that
confronts actors collectively (Yeung and Coe 2015, 41).
The management of risk involves economic (lead firms and subcontractors) and
noneconomic actors (institutional regulatory bodies and customers) developing coping
strategies across production networks. These coping mechanisms are explored by
conceptualizing four different actor-specific strategies that configure GPN: intrafirm
coordination, interfirm control, interfirm partnership, and extrafirm bargaining (Yeung
and Coe 2015). Heritage as a firm-level resource providing competitive advantage
relating to risk mitigation needs to be added to this list by exploring the debates on the
RBV and evolutionary economics.
The RBV of the firm provides a framework for understanding heritage as an
advantage-creating resource. In this approach, non–price-based advantages are founded
upon the internal resources of firms (Barney 1991). These may be tangible (land, raw
materials, financial assets) or intangible (reputation, relationships, brands, knowledge,
skills). Barney (1991) argues that resources that enhance firm competitiveness should
be valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable (VRIN). Intangible resources (non-
physical) are usually the most advantage creating, since they are often inimitable and
nonsubstitutable (Petrick et al. 1999; Haanes and Fjeldstad 2000; Hatch 2013).
Intangible resources can be divided into four categories: (1) intellectual property
assets, (2) organizational assets, (3) capabilities, and (4) reputational assets (Galbreath
2005). To O’Regan and Sims (2008, 410), firm competitiveness is often “multifactori-
al” and “cannot be attributed to only one resource.” Nevertheless, in some sectors, one
type of resource is perhaps more critical. For the space sector, the focus must be on
reputational assets as an advantage-creating resource and the role these play in the
management of risks. Reputational assets are identified as “observers’ collective
judgement of an organization,” based on personal experiences or secondary informa-
tion (Barnett, Jermier, and Lafferty 2006, 34). There are two components to a firm’s
reputation: (1) the overall company impression and (2) the product-specific component
(Caruana 1997). The overall impression is influenced by factors such as financial
stability and stewardship of noneconomic agendas (community/environment), whereas,
4
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the product-specific component is the result of characteristics such as quality manage-
ment and innovation levels (Hughes, Wrigley, and Buttle 2008). These two components
have a symbiotic relationship: product-specific reputation contributes to a company’s
overall impression.
Reputational assets signal quality, reliability, and credibility, serving as a quality
promise for future transactions (Galbreath 2005; Walsh and Beatty 2007). To mitigate
risks, buyers may select their suppliers based on whether or not they signal this quality
promise. Therefore, quality associations differentiate firms from competitors, enabling
them to “charge premium prices” and to attract customers, investors, and future
employees (Fombrun and Shanley 1990, 234; see also Turban, Forret, and
Hendrickson 1998). In the satellite industry, heritage forms part of the product-
specific component of firms’ reputational assets, providing a source of competitive
advantage. Heritage is an intangible resource that has a tangible measure, since it is
based on a firm’s or a product’s flight history, measured in days, months, and years,
and inclusion in a defined number of flights. To our knowledge, no attempt has been
made to conceptualize heritage in this way and present it as an advantage-creating
resource.
In addition to being a reputational asset, heritage is a competitive dynamic, acting
as an independent variable driving firm strategies and impacting routines. The
dynamic capabilities approach, which builds on the RBV, focuses on how firms
use their resources to identify and exploit market opportunities (Eusenhardt and
Martin 2000). To Phelps and Fuller (2016, 110), dynamic capabilities are “the
foundation of a firm’s ownership advantages, as they are the organisational capacity
and means by which resources are (re)deployed and (re)configured to achieve
particular priorities.” This approach emerged as economic geographers argued for
a shift in analytical “focus from the steady-state processes of equilibrium” (Martin
2010, 22) toward processes that entail path destruction or creation (MacKinnon
et al. 2009). In reality, as will be shown in the analysis, heritage has the opposite
effect to path destruction by encouraging inertia and path dependency. Nevertheless,
the dynamic capabilities approach contributes to this article’s theoretical framework
by highlighting the relationship between resources and market opportunities and the
contribution this makes to attracting customers, investors, and employees. The
organizational capacity of a firm is not static but instead continues to evolve via
alterations in a firm’s dynamic capabilities.
A further element of understanding heritage is recognizing the impact of past
decisions and the evaluation of these decisions on firm adaptation (Bathelt and
Glückler 2018). Heritage is defined by proven technology or past experiences that
influence firms’ present structures and activities. Conceptualizing heritage involves
exploring historic processes that are part of ongoing debates in evolutionary
approaches to economic geography (Boschma and Frenken 2018) that focus on how
organizational routines shape “intrafirm and interfirm processes” (Phelps and Fuller
2016, 123). This article’s theoretical framework draws upon RBV, dynamic capabili-
ties, and evolutionary theories, since they are all complementary approaches to under-
standing firms. For instance, the RBV is about the identification of resources providing
competitive advantages (Fahy 2002; Barney, Ketchen, and Wright 2011; Knoben
2011), whereas the evolutionary and dynamic capabilities perspectives highlight pro-
cesses that manage the development or use of these resources (Boschma and Frenken
2006; Bryson and Ronayne 2014). Both processes and resources must be considered
when exploring actor-specific strategies that minimize risk in a GPN.
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The evolutionary perspective contributes to understanding the role heritage plays in
driving firm strategies and impacting on firm routines. Routines are the “day-to-day deal-
ings” or “regular and predictable behavioral patterns” of firm that have “built up over time”
(Jensen, Poulfet and Kraus, 2010, 2048; see also Radwan and Kinder 2013). They guide
actions and decision-making processes by locking firms into strategies and behaviors
(Essletzbichler and Rigby 2007; Christopherson and Clark 2009; Cecere et al. 2014).
A firm’s strategy and behavior influence the development of and access to resources that
are sources of competitiveness (Bryson and Ronayne 2014). For example, realizing new
opportunities through innovation requires “relevant learning routines” (Bessant et al. 2012,
1108).
Routines can lead to path dependency, defined as the inability of a firm to “shake
free of [its] history” and develop beyond its “established ways of doing things” (Martin
and Sunley 2006, 400). The outcome is organizational inertia. A focus on organiza-
tional change and the assumption that dynamic capabilities only exist in action
(Ambrosini and Bowman 2009) can underplay organizational inertia, which firms
rely on to sustain competitive resources. Heritage as a path-dependent reputational
asset contributes to characterizing the sources of risk-related inertia that may exist in
GPN, alongside the sources of change or dynamics.
Path dependency can negatively impact on firm competitiveness by restricting
innovation (Martin and Sunley 2006; Isaksen 2014). For example, Gagliardi and
Iammarino (2018, 1178) argue that “firms’ attitude towards risk is a key determinant
of their successful innovation efforts” and that risky and uncertain market conditions
can present obstacles to innovation. This may cause technological lock-in, where firms
become locked into technologies (i.e., products or processes) that are not necessarily
“superior to alternative solutions” (Cecere et al. 2014, 1041). This lock-in may mean
firms “struggle to compete and survive” as competitors make disruptive changes and
develop superior technologies (Cecere et al. 2014, 1042).
Although technological lock-in is difficult to overcome, it is “often a temporary
phenomenon from which escape is possible” (Van der Vooren, Alkemade, and Hekkert
2012, 101). Industry and wider government policies can provide incentives and support
firms in overcoming negative lock-in (Radwan and Kinder 2013; Turco and Maggioni
2016). This form of institutional support is particularly important “for highly regulated
and relatively rigid sectors” (Steen and Hansen 2018, 192). It is an example of how
external factors unlock routines impacting firm-level competitiveness. Porter (1990)
also identifies external factors in his analysis of national competitive advantage as “one
of the most prominent and frequently applied approaches” to competitive research
(Dögl, Holtbrügge, and Schuster 2012, 193). External factors relate to the public
governance of the industry, the system of rules, or mechanism of decision-making
imposed by the state (Mayer and Pickles 2010; Levi-Faur 2012).
Nonstate actors (such as credit rating agencies) are other external factors that shape
market structures by setting standards and norms across industries (Nadvi 2008; Coe and
Yeung 2015). Private insurance is another “central institution of governance beyond the
state” (Ericson, Barry, and Doyle 2000, 532); insurance companies have the capacity to
“set standards” (in respect of risks) and “enforce compliance” (via payment and premium
levels) (Scott 2002, 65). Research on the maritime sector identified that insurers are
incentivized to help “manage risk,” since “they bear the financial consequences” of any
losses they insure against (Bennett 2000, 880). Consequently, insurers often become
actively involved in shaping or influencing procurement decisions. Bennett (2000, 87)
notes that where insurance is compulsory, an insurer adopts the role of “enforcer”
becoming, in effect, a “watchdog over its customers rather than a service provider.”
6
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Insurers base their decisions on whether to insure a firm on a range of factors, including
financial responsibility, where the firm “must have access to enough capital to meet
a specified level of liability” (Bennett 2000, 884). Therefore, it is important to explore the
impact of private insurers on UK satellite companies, specifically how the decision-
making processes reinforce the importance of heritage. This focus on private insurers
addresses the gap in the literature where “lower-level decisions” made by “non-state
organizations” have been neglected from studies of “contemporary governance arrange-
ments” (Scott 2002, 56). The approach adopted by private insurers is country specific and
evidence of why territorial influences should be considered as an independent variable
shaping the practices of lead firms (Neilson et al. 2018). The next section outlines the
approach adopted by this article to researching the space sector, and justifies the selected
research design and methodology.
Researching the Space Sector
The space industry involves the production of space technology (launch vehicles,
satellites, and user ground equipment and terminals) and satellite-enabled services
(global positioning systems, telecommunication, and earth observation data) (London
Economics 2015). These production activities are divided among the following groups
of firms or subsectors:
1. Space manufacturers: manufacture launch vehicles, ground systems, and satellites.
2. Satellite operators: control satellites when in orbit and sell communication band-
width, positioning signals, or observation data.
3. Satellite application providers: supply space-enabled services such as earth obser-
vation imagery and satellite television.
These subsectors are interdependent but comprise different firms, value chains, and
financial characteristics. This article explores the activities of UK space manufacturers,
which are primarily involved in the production of satellite hardware and subsystems.
These manufacturers are less concerned with the manufacture of launch vehicles and
ground equipment, since the UK government pulled out of launch/manned space
missions in 1970. There are currently no UK launch sites. Consequently, the terms
space industry and satellite industry are often used interchangeably when referring to
the UK, since satellites and satellite-enabled services are at the center of the UK’s
space activities.
To explore the organization of the UK space industry, eighty in-depth interviews
were conducted. The data were collected in a single time period, between November 7,
2014, and July 14, 2015. Interview cases were selected from the three subsectors
(manufacturing, operating, and satellite-enabled applications). Although the primary
focus of this article is on satellite manufacturers, insights from the other subsectors are
relevant. Operators and application providers are the manufacturers’ customers and
define market imperatives shaping manufacturers’ sources of competitiveness.
Additionally, government organizations (UK Space Agency, European Space Agency,
Innovate UK, Satellite Applications Catapult, OFCOM, UK Steering Board, G-STEP,
RAL Space) were interviewed to provide an external perspective on the sector.
Furthermore, representatives from two insurance companies were interviewed to eval-
uate the role private insurance plays in shaping the activities of firms involved in the
UK space sector. Their inclusion was in response to the manufacturers’ interviews,
which highlighted the importance of insurance. Similarly, a space legal practitioner was
7
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interviewed to provide the necessary context for understanding the origins and com-
plexities of the legal frameworks and international treaties governing the UK space
sector.
A purposive sampling method was used to allocate individual cases to the various
subgroups. It selected information-rich cases, which yielded “insight and in-depth
understanding” on “issues of central importance” to the research questions (Patton
2002, 273). The form of purposive sampling used was stratified, whereby cases were
“selected in proportion to one or more characteristic in the population” (Gorard 2013,
81). The two characteristics were the size (measured by number of employees) and
function (manufacturing, operations, and application provision). Two groups of
manufacturing firms were represented in the sample: (1) prime satellite manufacturers,
who design satellites, divide tasks, and manage the final integration of components;
and (2) subcontractors, who supply materials, hardware components, and subsystems.
The stratified approach helped to ensure maximum diversity of research participants.
This increased the likelihood of competing explanations being investigated, which was
important for accurately characterizing the industry and maximizing internal validity
(Henderson et al. 2002; Bryman 2012; Gorard 2013).
A database was created of UK satellite firms from the case groups, using the UK
Space Directory (2015). The UK Space Directory is produced by the Knowledge
Transfer Network (KTN) and lists profiles (including the functions) of UK satellite
manufacturers, operators, and application providers. The firms in each case group
were categorized according to size (as measured by number of employees), using the
Financial Accounts Made Easy (FAME) data set, which lists information (e.g., name,
location, industry affiliation) on UK VAT-registered firms (FAME 2015).).
Nevertheless, FAME is not a comprehensive register; small firms are exempt from
reporting their annual accounts, and new market entrants can take up to two years to
submit their first annual accounts (Department of Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform 2009). Therefore, FAME did not have the details of thirty-three
(38 percent) of the cases listed in the UK Space Directory. Consequently, extra
searches on firm size were undertaken using company websites, trade association
membership lists, and LinkedIn.
In total, eighty participants were interviewed. The final response rate was 92 percent.
This can be explained by two factors. First, the access strategy targeted individuals by
an effective use of social media, including LinkedIn. This avoided the difficulties of
working with gatekeepers. Second, the interviewees considered that this research
would contribute to raising the space industry’s profile. The sample size was deter-
mined in the early stages of the research design and was considered an appropriate
number for achieving “informativeness, reliability and generalizability” (Smith 2000,
319). The number of participants was flexible around the data needs of the research,
with recruitment only ending when it was apparent that new data would not signifi-
cantly add to the development of theory. Those who declined to participate in the study
were replaced by a representative from a case in the same subgroup.
The interviews ranged in length from thirty to ninety minutes and were semi-
structured, consisting of a set of prearranged questions. The interview structure was
divided into three parts: (1) background/product questions, (2) organization and
governance of production, and (3) impact of regulation. These related to the three
research questions.
Data collection was undertaken concurrently, with three stages of analysis (transcrip-
tion and description, classification, and coding) to ensure any knowledge gaps were
addressed. Initially, the research questions and theories from the literature provided
8
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a set of codes. The analysis was not confined to these preliminary codes, as inductive
codes were identified as new themes were observed. The codes across the various
transcripts were connected, which involved identifying patterns in the data or similarities
and differences between different cases. This highlighted where there was consensus or
disagreement in response to research questions. These comparisons or connections that
were identified then formed the basis of the research discussion. The next section, in
addressing the first research question, focuses on the role of private insurers in setting
standards and enforcing compliance in the satellite industry, and the impact of state
regulation, in intensifying the importance placed on heritage by the sector.
Regulators and Insurance Providers Defining Risk
Management as a Market Imperative
For high-risk sectors, such as the space industry, minimizing risk is a market
imperative that has led to the role heritage plays as a competitive resource. This is
driven by state and nonstate actors enforcing regulations, which shapes economic
activities and competitive dynamics. This section focuses on state and nonstate actors’
influence, by considering the role that nonfirm actors play in GPN by shaping the
organization of production and competitive dynamics within and across different
sectors (Yeung and Coe 2015).
For the space industry, the stringent regulations set by nation-states are
a significant nonfirm actor constraint. A space licence must be obtained from the
UK Space Agency before a satellite can be launched and an operator can enter the
market. This space licensing process was introduced in response to the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty1 (OST), which is the principal treaty for “regulating activities in outer
space” and outlines the core principles that guide UN member states in relation to
their actions in space (Al-Rodhan 2012, 194). In compliance with the OST, the UK
government dictates that “space activities carried out by UK individuals or organiza-
tions: (i) do not jeopardise public health or the safety of persons or property; and (ii)
are consistent with the international obligations of the UK” (HM Government 2015).
The UK government’s licensing process is intended to remove the risks to public
health and international jurisdictions, through managing what can and cannot be
launched by UK satellite operators. Before satellite operators are awarded a UK
space licence, they must answer a set of questions about their technology and the
satellite’s mission; their facilities may also be subject to “inspection and testing” (HM
Government 2015). These checks assess the readiness level of the satellite technology,
any national security concerns, and whether the manufacturers and operators involved
have experience with space missions and flight history. Similarly, there is a credit
check, to assess whether the operator has “the means to carry the activities out and can
afford the insurance that we [UK Government] expect to be in place until deorbit”
(Interview, GovPolicy3e). Credit checks consider the operator’s financial stability but
also their flight history, where “if you’ve got a company that’s already operating then
you are obviously going to consider their satellite more likely to go ahead” (Interview,
GovRegulator1). The technology and credit checks reinforce the importance of heritage
in the space sector, which in turn influences firm-level routines such as innovation.
Private insurers are also influencers in the space industry, since a space licence will
only be awarded to a satellite operator with the appropriate insurance in place to cover
1 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, October 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
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the risks. The private insurance firms that manage space insurance are a “relatively
small but international community” (Manikowski and Weiss 2013, 151), with only
“about 35 satellite insurers worldwide” (Interview, SatelliteInsuranceProvider1). These
are concentrated in Europe (London, Paris, and Munich) and the US (New York and
Washington, DC), with London accounting for the greatest number, with 30 to 35 per-
cent of the international market.
Until the 1960s, most satellites were launched for military purposes. Historically
satellites were uninsured, since they had “no direct revenues associated with them” and
any risks were “retained by governments and the Space Agencies that financed” them
(Manikowski and Weiss 2013, 151). This is no longer the case for the present
commercial space market in which satellite operators are responsible for obtaining
their own private insurance to protect their revenues and insure against all identifiable
risks. Space insurance allows “the operator to take out risk, safe in the knowledge that
if something goes wrong then they will get their money back” (Interview,
SatelliteInsuranceProvider2). Insurance also plays an important role in many other
global industries (Bennett 2000). However, with space technology, there is the added
complexity that once it is launched “you never see it again” (Interview,
PrimeSatelitteManufacturer2). This situation is unlike other high-tech industries and
encourages a preference for proven technology because, if something goes wrong, “you
can’t go up there and fix it” (Interview, PrimeSatelitteManufacturer1).
Satellites tend to be insured against known events, including environmental (i.e.,
space debris and solar flares) and military threats, including deliberate actions by
a noninsured party. Nevertheless, damage to a satellite can be caused by anything.
For instance, “we had a claim last year because of a piece of Velcro that got stuck in
a communications valve; they used Velcro when they put the thermal blanket on the
satellite and a stray piece got stuck in the communications valve. And that was a claim
of $214 million” (Interview, SatelliteInsuranceProvider1).
There are two types of satellite insurance: (1) liability insurance, which protects
national interests; and (2) damage insurance, which protects the commercial company.
All UK satellite launches must have a minimum of £60 million of liability insurance.
Liability insurance is based on the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (1972)2 and article 7 of the OST, which stipulates that
“launching states are responsible to third parties for any damage induced by one of
their satellites” (Montpert 2016, 284). Unlike damage insurance, liability insurance
protects the company and the launching state against the financial consequences of
damage caused to a third party. This damage could be to the Earth’s surface or to
objects in the atmosphere.
Meanwhile, damage insurance is “designed to protect operators against the physical
loss or the reduction in performance of a satellite” (Manikowski and Weiss 2013, 177).
It can be purchased by operators in different forms, which cover satellites for different
time periods: launch phase, postseparation, first twelve months, ten years, and satellite
design life. The most commonly purchased form is the launch phase, since it covers the
most difficult and the most demanding part of a satellite mission, where “for 90 s you
have a chance of your entire $400 million going up in smoke” (Interview,
SatelliteOperator2). Such policies cover events such as faulty designs, ground operator
mistakes, and inadequate testing. Claims can be for full or partial loss, depending on
the loss of the satellite service.
2 March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 10 I.L.M. 965.
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Premiums for damage insurance are influenced by the mission to be performed by
the satellite, financial stability of the operators, and the heritage of the satellite design
defined as the established flight history of the components. This reinforces the impor-
tance of heritage: insurance premiums are influenced by the heritage of the satellite
design. One firm noted that “even if you said ‘this 3cm diameter bolt is new’ then the
insurance would probably go up by millions and genuinely millions” (Interview,
SatelliteComponentManufacturer7). This has implications on the operators’ choice of
supplier and manufacturers’ procurement of components, as they opt for firms or
products with heritage. It is evidence of how “lower-level decisions” made by “non-
state organizations” can influence firm-level behavior (Scott 2002, 56) and highlights
the influence heritage can have on GPN (Neilson et al. 2018). The competitive
advantages that heritage provides for satellite manufacturers will be explored in the
next section.
Heritage as a Reputational Asset and Source of Competitive
Advantage
A satellite is launched into orbit under the following extreme conditions: (1) high
levels of vibration, (2) mechanical shock, (3) a temperature gradient of up to 200°C
degrees, and (4) rapidly declining atmospheric pressure (Fortescue, Swinerd, and Stark
2011). Together with the harsh in-orbit environment, this exposes satellites to a high
risk of component disruption or failure. Satellite manufacturers, operators, insurers,
financiers, and regulators all try to mitigate these risks. Risks are reduced by industry
stakeholders prioritizing suppliers and components with established heritage. This is
encouraged because a firm’s evidence of heritage will help to reduce its insurance
premiums while also serving as a proxy measure of quality for the space licensing
process. Because of the relationship between heritage, insurance premiums, and space
licenses, heritage influences the decisions of investors, potential employees, customers,
and suppliers (determining who is involved in the GPN). There are two types of space
heritage: “the heritage in the product and the heritage in the firm itself” (Interview,
SatelliteComponentManufacturer3). Often these exist simultaneously but sometimes
separately. A firm may have a proven flight history but not for all of its products. In the
satellite industry, heritage forms part of the product-specific component of firms’
reputational assets.
Heritage provides firms with a competitive advantage by signaling competence-based
trust (defined as the perception of partners on whether they will effectively contribute to
a relationship) to key stakeholders (Barney 1991; Galbreath 2005). Competence-based
trust is signaled in this way, since heritage demonstrates that satellite manufacturers have
worked on previous space missions and thus will have a “better understanding of how
things should work” (Interview, SatelliteComponentManufacturer1). Competence-based
trust is important because it attracts buyers and encourages repeat purchasing. For
example, for a satellite operator “spending $500–600 million on a satellite, they don’t
want it to break” so they will work with a manufacturer with a proven flight history
(Interview, PrimeSateliteManufacturer3). Critically, contracting a manufacturer with
heritage also increases the likelihood of the operator obtaining a space licence and
avoiding expensive insurance premiums calculated without reductions based on heritage.
Additionally, experienced manufacturers are more likely to have a broad range of net-
works, since “the more projects you do, the more people you know” (Interview,
SatelliteComponentManufacturer2). These networks are important as they increase the
resources available to a firm and, in doing so, broaden the firm’s competencies, which in
11
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turn promotes trust. Trust is a key influencing factor for convincing external financiers to
lend money to, or invest in, a firm, which is critical to firm competitiveness. This
attraction of buyers and investors is valued so highly that it means that it allows firms
with heritage to “charge premium prices,” avoiding price-based competition (Fombrun
and Shanley 1990, 234).
Furthermore, manufacturers with heritage become “well known in the space
community” or, in effect, hold a “higher-status” in the market (Interview,
SatelliteComponentManufacturer4). Consequently, they find that customers, other
firms, and research centers often approach them “with ideas and proposals”
(Interview, SatelliteComponentManufacturer4). This assists firms in accessing ex-
ternal knowledge, driving innovation, and helping meet customer requirements.
This is an example of accumulative advantage, whereby firms that have had early
successes in the industry are advantaged in the present market (Podolny 1993).
Similarly, heritage attracts skilled employees, as it certifies the firm’s credibility
and ensures they are well known in the labor market (Interview,
SatelliteComponentManufacturer5). In any industry, “attracting and retaining …
human capital can provide firms with a sustained competitive advantage” (Turban,
Forret, and Hendrickson 1998, 25). This is arguably more significant for the space
industry, since there are hard-to-fill vacancies reflecting the technical expertise
required to develop satellites. Therefore, there is competition for the graduates
who are available, “not just within the UK itself, but also Europe and overseas”
(Interview, SatelliteComponentManufacturer6). This competition is even more in-
tense for smaller firms, since they find that the graduates they seek “are generally going
to the larger aerospace companies” (Interview, SatelliteComponentManufacturer5). As
a result, anything that distinguishes a firm, such as heritage, plays a valuable role in
attracting and retaining skilled employees.
The above examples highlight how heritage, as a competitive resource, drives
market opportunities in the space sector by attracting customers, investors, and future
employees (Eusenhardt and Martin 2000). This conceptualization of heritage is like an
additional resource to those identified as intangible sources of competitive advantage in
the RBV literature (Barney 1991; Barney, Ketchen, and Wright 2011). It also aligns
with the evolutionary perspective, which argues that a firm’s innovation potential is
dependent on its “existing variety” of capabilities and assets (Boschma and Frenken
2006, 636). All RBV research begins with the explicit or implicit assumption of firm
heterogeneity (Lockett, Thompson, and Morgenstern 2009). In the case of satellite
manufacturers, not all firms will have heritage, and those who do will need to develop
and maintain it through firm-specific routines. The next section explores these firm-
specific routines and the contribution they make to the role heritage plays in risk
mitigation.
Heritage as a Competitive Dynamic Influencing Firm-based
Routines in Satellite Manufacturing and Operations
As well as an advantage-creating resource, heritage is a competitive dynamic, acting
as an independent variable driving firm strategies and impacting on their routines. This
occurs as satellite manufacturers develop and maintain heritage as a reputational asset.
Conceptualizing heritage in this way contributes to the development of the GPN 2.0
analytical framework, which aims to understand the relationship between risk and
actor-specific strategies.
12
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Developing heritage takes time, since it involves involvement/inclusion in several
satellite missions. This means that the product or firm must continue to be involved in
the sector, and this involvement is part of an ongoing process of heritage creation and
accumulation. This takes two forms: (1) the development of a reputation for successful
participation and (2) component and product flight history. Nevertheless, a product/
firm must first secure a first flight on a satellite mission. This is far from straightfor-
ward, since without heritage, stakeholders (customers, investors, collaborators, the
Space Agency, etc.) are unlikely to trust or licence the product or firm. The outcome
is a chicken-and-egg–type scenario. A product or firm must be involved in a satellite
mission to develop flight history, but without heritage, it is unlikely to be considered as
flight ready and flight safe. Prime satellite or component manufacturers overcome this
barrier by giving their first sale for free and paying for their own test flight. This
involves speculation and a significant upfront capital investment, but there can be no
guarantee of repeat custom. Additionally, firms can pay for a test flight, but it is
expensive (“it costs 20,000 Euros to test pilot a cable”) and even then firms still need
evidence of flight history (Interview, SatelliteComponentManufacturer2). It is also
possible for a satellite manufacturer to acquire heritage through mergers and acquisi-
tions of firms with heritage, but this is an expensive option and not always viable.
An alternative option is for firms to bid for institutional grants and projects, funded by
the European Commission and European Space Agency (ESA). These projects support
technological developments, innovation, and reduce risk, contributing to the creation of
heritage. For example, one of the Prime satellite manufacturers benefited from the ESA
having funded “a test model going up [into orbit]” of its next-generation satellite. This
would have been more difficult for the Prime to achieve commercially “because with
insurers it is just impossible” for them to support the launch of new technologies, without
issuing “unaffordable premiums” (Interview, PrimeSatelliteManufacturer3). This is an
example of how government policies can support firms in overcoming negative lock-out
from a GPN on the basis of insufficient heritage, as nonfirm actor interventions can
contribute to the creation of heritage (Radwan and Kinder 2013; Turco and Maggioni
2016). Nevertheless, support provided by nonfirm actors is not guaranteed for every
project, and smaller firms are often underresourced to be able to manage the ESA grant
application process.
Once manufacturers have developed heritage, it is sustained and continually rein-
forced through procurement routines that emphasize the importance of heritage. For
instance, manufacturers only subcontract the production of components to firms that
themselves have heritage. This contributes to understanding interfirm coordination in
GPN but also the ways in which such coordination is shaped by the activities of
nonfirm actors and the finance actors, in this case insurers. For industries where risk is
a market imperative, certain value activities will be outsourced to only a select group of
suppliers (Yeung and Coe 2015).
Additionally, satellite manufacturers maintain their heritage by making only incre-
mental alterations to products/software/processes. This impacts on innovative routines
across the value chain and leads to further technological lock-in. For example, despite
being “a very high tech sector,” the value placed on heritage makes the UK space
industry “very conservative,” since, in order to reduce the risk of failure, customers are
“reluctant to use new technologies” (Interview, GovPolicy1). This inhibits radical
forms of innovation (technologies that are new to the market) despite the potential
advantages they might offer. For example, “even if you’ve got the latest sexy antennae
that are going to take a fraction of cost to launch and be far more reliable, no one will
go first to take that risk” (Interview, SatelliteComponentManufacturer6). This prevents
13
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satellite manufacturers from gaining competitive advantages attached to new forms of
technology. It implies that second-mover advantage is better than first-mover advan-
tage in this sector—thus creating a paradox. Instead, firms are limited to incremental
innovations or minor improvements to existing products, for which the impact is
considerably less “pervasive and profound” than with radical innovation (Lengnick-
Hall 1992, 402). Consequently, heritage is a source of risk-related inertia that can exist
in GPN, alongside sources of change or dynamics.
Similarly, heritage limits diversification. Diversification occurs when firms move
outside core areas of competency into other product lines. This can lead to “superior
firm performance,” maximizing potential business opportunities and increasing returns
(Wan et al. 2011, 1338). These impacts would be particularly beneficial for upstream
manufacturers, due to the cyclicality of the space market, which can leave the manu-
facturers without work for months at a time. Nevertheless, heritage inhibits diversifica-
tion as firms become locked-in to “supplying only certain components” in which they
have established and recognized heritage. Thus they are locked-in to a specific role in
a GPN and find it difficult to break out to develop a different role. Developing heritage in
new areas is challenging, and there will always be a more experienced competitor with
heritage in that product line (Interview, SatelliteComponentManufacturer1). For exam-
ple, one of the component manufacturers specialized in cables “but wanted to be more
dynamic and make a new microwave component.” They responded to an invitation to
tender for this product from a Prime, but they lost out to a “microwave manufacturer
with heritage” (Interview, SatelliteComponentManufacturer3). Government-funded pro-
grams have provided opportunities for firms to be more radical in their approach to
innovation and to diversifying their product base. However, it is important that research
on the role heritage plays in GPN considers the negative as well as positive impacts it has
on firm-level competitiveness and in the shaping of GPN.
Conclusion
The ongoing development of the GPN approach has shifted from exploring the
governance of production networks to a more recent focus on dynamics. Central to
the dynamics of GPN is a concern with risks and the activities of nonfirm actors. This
article engages in these debates by highlighting the ways in which heritage plays
a central role in the management of risks and in mediating the dynamics of satellite
production networks. It is perhaps surprising that the competitiveness of one of the
most high-tech industrial sectors is founded not upon innovation but on heritage.
Nevertheless, in nearly every interview, interviewees highlighted the importance of
heritage as a primary or core source of competitiveness in the space industry. It is the
firms themselves who have added heritage to this analysis.
Production processes involve many different types of risks and uncertainties, includ-
ing technological change, new competitors and/or alternative products, and the chang-
ing nature of demand. All industries have idiosyncratic aspects, but in the space sector,
the types of risks firms face are extreme. For example, there are risks related to launch
and citizen safety. Additionally, there is the high cost of satellite infrastructure and the
fact that once a satellite is up there it cannot be easily repaired. Consequently,
a spacecraft needs to be resilient against high levels of vibration, extreme temperature
gradients, and rapidly declining atmospheric pressure. Reputation and trust go some
way to tempering risks such as these in production relationships. In the space sector,
trust-based relationships are underpinned by the measurable heritage of products and/or
firms. Heritage is a resource, characterized by attributes from a firm’s past that act as
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proxy measures of competency that support a firm’s current activities. For satellite
manufacturers, the most relevant attribute is flight history or the number of successful
satellite missions involving a firm and its products. Heritage is embedded in products
that have a history and can be defined as proven products or proven technologies. It is
this heritage that enables firms to participate in a space GPN; firms without such
heritage are excluded. These products or components reflect firm-level forms of
inimitability in which it is difficult for a purchaser/procurer to identify substitute
products or providers.
It is important to place heritage in the space sector within the wider context of
international regulation and insurance. The emphasis placed on heritage is intensified
by the interactions between space manufacturing and insurance, and the requirement
for all launches to obtain a government licence that is conditional on appropriate
insurance being in place. Insurance with affordable or commercially acceptable pre-
miums can only be obtained for products and firms with established and recognizable
heritage. The strategies of UK satellite manufacturers are driven by a requirement to
de-risk products and processes by relying on proven technology as well as mediating
their relationship with global insurance providers and national regulators. This theoret-
ically informed empirical analysis of heritage and space contributes to the development
of the dynamic GPN literature by considering the role that firm and nonfirm actors play
in shaping the organization of production and competitive dynamics within and across
different sectors.
Heritage supports the development of in-house expertise, cannot be imitated, and
differentiates firms by signaling competence-based trust to key stakeholders (including
customers, investors, and employees). This provides three forms of competitive advan-
tage for UK satellite manufacturers. First, it attracts buyers and encourages repeat
purchasing. In the space sector, a buyer’s perception of a manufacturer’s competency
is guided by heritage. This also allows firms with heritage to charge premium prices and
avoid price-based competition, since they compete on the basis of their heritage and not
price. Second, it reduces the overall cost of product delivery—the satellite—as it reduces
insurance premiums to a commercially acceptable rate. Third, heritage attracts colla-
borators, investors, and skilled employees, since it signals a firm’s credibility and ensures
the firm is well known in the market. This conceptualization of heritage is a development
of the RBV literature emphasis on intangible competitive resources and aligns with the
evolutionary perspective that argues a firm’s potential is, in part, dependent on its
existing assets (Boschma and Frenken 2006; Barney, Ketchen, and Wright 2011).
Heritage is also a competitive dynamic, acting as a variable driving firm strategies and
impacting on their procurement routines. It impacts on manufacturers’ interfirm coordi-
nation, since in wanting to protect their heritage they are very selective about which
activities they can outsource and to which independent suppliers (Yeung and Coe 2015).
Additionally, satellite manufacturers maintain their heritage by making only incremental
changes to their products, which impacts on innovative routines, inhibits diversification,
and leads to technological lock-in. Therefore, heritage is a source of risk-related inertia
that can exist in GPN, alongside the sources of change or dynamics. Government policies
may support firms as they attempt to overcome this form of heritage lock-out.
To understand the complexities of heritage as a firm-based resource and competitive
dynamic, further research is warranted. This would involve exploring other industries in
which heritage is a critical source of competitiveness (such as maritime, nuclear energy,
rail, medical technologies, and aviation), comparing the different types of heritage
(technology-based, relationship-based, etc.), and how heritage is developed or overcome
(including the roles played by nonfirm actors). Additionally, further research is required to
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reflect upon the impact of the New Space revolution on technologies and business models
in the UK and across the global sector. New Space is a term used to describe the emerging
private spaceflight industry and venture capitalist-funded small satellite constellations led
by Astropreners (Thornhill 2017). SpaceX is at the forefront of this, having successfully
landed a reusable rocket in the last year, an innovation that reduces launch costs (TechUK
2018). The entrepreneurs leading these new technologies and business models are
deviating from the established trajectories by breaking out of the limitations placed on
the industry. The New Space firms’ self-insure launches are creating new technology
pathways and are potentially overcoming forms of heritage lock-out (Steen and Hansen
2018). Further study is needed to understand the impact this is having on the dynamics of
the industry and ways in which firm and nonfirm actors manage risk.
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